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Abstract 
Three studies investigated the interplay between processing capacity and reliance on 
accessibility experiences versus reliance on accessible content. Participants low in 
processing capacity were more likely to rely on the experience of ease versus difficulty, 
whereas participants high in processing capacity were more likely to base their judgment on 
the accessible content information. This result was robust across two different judgmental 
domains and was further supported by the assessment of processing latencies during 
judgment formation as an indicator of the underlying processes. In combination, the reported 
findings suggest that reliance on ease-of-retrieval experiences is particularly likely in 
situations of low processing capacity. 
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Relying on accessible content versus accessibility experiences:  
The case of processing capacity 
It has long been suggested that judgments may be based on both accessible content (e.g., 
Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989) and subjective experiences that accompany information 
processing (e.g., contributions in Bless & Forgas, 2000). With respect to subjective 
experiences, the role of accessibility experiences has received particular attention. Starting 
with Tversky and Kahneman (1973), it has been suggested that the experience of the “ease 
with which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (p. 208) influences judgments 
and decisions across a wide range of domains (for an overview see Schwarz, 1998, 2004), 
including, for example, attitude formation (Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996; Haddock, 2000), 
stereotyping (Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999), frequency estimates (Wänke, 
Schwarz, & Bless, 1995), group perception (Rothman & Hardin, 1997), health-related 
behavior (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), or advertising (Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997). 
Despite the highly prominent role of the ease-of-retrieval heuristic in judgment and decision 
making, and despite the seeming universality of the influence of the experienced ease-of-
retrieval, only a handful of research endeavors investigated whether the use of these kinds of 
cognitive experiences is ubiquitous, or whether it is restricted to certain situational 
circumstances. The current research set out to further our understanding of this important 
question. 
Previous research on factors that moderate reliance on accessibility experiences  
Apart from a small set of investigations, we know little about factors that moderate the 
reliance on subjective experiences in judgment formation (for notable exceptions, see 
below). This scarcity is striking, considering both the theoretical (for a review, see Schwarz, 
1998) and practical importance (e.g., Wänke et al., 1997; Raghubir & Menon, 1998; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 1999) of cognitive subjective experiences such as the ease-of-retrieval 
phenomenon. One obvious reason for this lack of evidence is the fact that both paths of 
judgment formation addressed here – accessible content versus accessibility experiences – 
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were long intertwined in research on the ease-of-retrieval phenomenon, thus prohibiting 
conclusions about moderation (see Schwarz et al., 1991). Only when experimental 
paradigms separating the two pathways became available, questions of moderation could be 
addressed convincingly. One such paradigm was introduced by Schwarz and colleagues 
(1991) by setting up the judgmental stage in such a way that opposing results are 
hypothesized for the experiential versus the content-based pathway. Specifically, participants 
were asked to recall differential amounts of information, with some recalling few and others 
many instances of previous self-assertive behavior. Afterwards, participants judged their own 
self-assertiveness. If individuals relied on the accessible content in forming these kinds of 
judgments, the recall of many as compared to few examples would result in higher 
perceptions of self-assertiveness. Conversely, if individuals relied on their accessibility 
experiences, the retrieval of few examples (an easy task) as compared to many (a difficult 
task) would lead to higher ratings of self-assertiveness. After all, if it is easy (difficult) to come 
up with instances of one’s own self-assertiveness, chances are that one is (is not) self-
assertive. Given this propensity, and given that the paradigm has been successfully 
established in various research endeavors (cf. Schwarz, 1998, for an overview), we built 
upon this methodology in the current set of studies. 
To our knowledge, only four potential moderators have been investigated in 
paradigms that allow for a differentiation between content and accessibility experiences. 
First, addressing the role of mood, Ruder and Bless (2003) reported evidence that reliance 
on experiential information is more likely for individuals in happy versus sad mood states. 
Second, the influence of participants’ motivation on the use of subjective experiences has 
been investigated, though with inconsistent results. Reliance on the experience of ease or 
difficulty was found to be likely both for people low in processing motivation (Rothman & 
Schwarz, 1998; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Florack & Zoabi, 
2003; for related evidence in the domain of personal interest, see Haddock, 2002) and for 
people high in processing motivation (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002). 
Third, attitude extremity has been shown to decrease reliance on accessibility experiences 
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(Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999). Fourth, it has been 
demonstrated that individuals cease to rely on the experience of ease-of-retrieval if the 
validity of these experiences has been called into question by means of a misattribution 
paradigm (Schwarz et al., 1991, Experiment 3). Thus, the perceived diagnosticity can be 
considered another factor that moderates the use of accessible content versus accessibility 
experiences. While readily acknowledging this aspect, we argue that the primary contribution 
of the misattribution studies lies in the demonstration that feelings (here the experienced 
ease-of-retrieval) may provide a judgmental basis to begin with (see our rationale for 
Experiment 3). 
Processing capacity moderates the reliance on accessibility experiences 
The present manuscript investigates the hitherto neglected role of processing capacity as a 
moderator of the impact of accessible content versus accessibility experiences. Specifically, 
joining two well-established currents of social cognition research, we argue that reliance on 
accessibility experiences is particularly likely in situations of low processing capacity. The 
following is to detail our theorizing.  
Koriat and Levy-Sadot (1999) proposed that cognitive feelings are meta-summaries of 
currently activated content or ongoing processes, boiling complex situational data down to 
single pieces of experiential information. This notion parallels evidence in the realm of 
affective feelings (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Clore, 1992), suggesting that cognitive feelings 
may be used in a heuristic manner, allowing for fast and frugal processing. Indeed, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973) themselves considered the reliance on subjective experiences in 
judgment formation a heuristic strategy. From such a perspective, conditions fostering 
reliance on heuristics should be a fruitful venue for investigating factors that moderate the 
use of subjective experiences. Consequently, the next question pertains to conditions that 
render heuristic processing more likely. Consistent with several dual-process models of 
attitude formation (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), heuristic 
processing strategies are particularly likely in situations of low processing intensity, that is, if 
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either the motivation or the capacity to process are lacking. Conversely, systematic 
processing strategies are particularly likely in situations of high processing intensity, that is, if 
the motivation and the capacity to process are given. In a typical experiment on dual-process 
models, participants are presented with two types of content (e.g., high vs. low quality 
arguments) that are orthogonally associated with a heuristic cue (e.g., high vs. low expertise 
of the presenter). Results generally indicate that differential content information is taken into 
account when processing intensity is high, whereas differential cue information is taken into 
account when processing intensity is low. 
Combining these two lines of research (conceptualization of accessibility experiences 
and dual-process models of attitude formation), we suggest that situations of low processing 
capacity increase the probability that people will rely on accessibility experiences, while 
conditions of high processing capacity increase the probability that people will rely on the 
accessible content. Unsurprisingly, similar hypotheses would also pertain to processing 
motivation as a moderator, because processing motivation and capacity are functionally 
similar in that they are sufficient for low processing intensity and necessary but not sufficient 
for high processing intensity. At the same time, however, processing motivation and capacity 
are generally treated as independent and conceptually different (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). For the 
current research, one implication of the functional similarities between processing motivation 
and capacity is worth noting: To individually investigate the moderating function of 
processing capacity on the reliance on accessibility experiences, it is necessary to keep 
processing motivation at a constant high level. The current research established this 
precondition by motivating participants to process attentively, regardless of experimental 
condition.  
In sum, we propose that reliance on accessible content versus accessibility 
experiences is moderated by participants’ processing capacity, such that lower processing 
capacity is associated with more pronounced reliance on accessibility experiences.  
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Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate the central hypothesis that people in conditions of 
low processing capacity tend to judge based on their subjective experiences, whereas 
people high in processing capacity tend to go with the content at hand. To this end, we 
manipulated both the experience of ease, by varying the amount of information (cf. Schwarz 
et al., 1991), and processing capacity. Specifically, half of the participants were asked to 
retrieve from memory a few arguments in favor of a certain position (easy condition), the 
other half was asked to retrieve many arguments (difficult condition). Orthogonally to this 
manipulation of retrieval ease, half of the participants made their attitudinal judgments while 
their processing capacity was impaired, whereas no such constraints were imposed on the 
other half. To assure that the high capacity group not only had the necessary processing 
capacity, but also the required motivation to process the available information in a systematic 
manner, all participants were motivated to process accurately. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-seven students from the University of Mannheim participated in 
return for EUR 2.50 (approximately USD 2.00) in what was called an experiment on 
information processing. Forty-six percent were male and the average age was 22.9 years 
(SD = 4.0). 
Design and manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (few vs. many 
arguments) x 2 (high vs. low processing capacity) between participants factorial design. The 
ease-of-retrieval manipulation was based on the methodology introduced by Schwarz and 
colleagues (1991). Specifically, participants were asked to recall either two or five reasons in 
favor of the introduction of a new quarterly surgery fee. Independent pre-testing at the 
University of Mannheim had shown that retrieving two arguments is easy, while retrieving five 
arguments is rather difficult.  
Differences in processing capacity were obtained by means of a dual-task paradigm. 
Specifically, while responding to the dependent variables, half of the participants (low 
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capacity group) were asked to complete a secondary task. This secondary task consisted of 
remembering an eight-digit number that participants were allowed to rehearse for five 
seconds before the primary task set in (for a successful use of this kind of manipulation, cf. 
Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). Additionally, processing time was strictly limited to seven seconds 
per dependent variable to prevent participants from alleviating the processing load by taking 
more time. Neither the dual-task paradigm nor the time limitation applied to the other half of 
participants (high capacity group).  
Very importantly, the capacity manipulation was instigated after the manipulation of 
retrieval ease. This order of manipulations is decisive, as the paradigm introduced by 
Schwarz and colleagues (1991) relies on a backward-inference from participants’ judgments 
to the presumed underlying processes. Noticeably, this backward-inference is meaningful 
only if the experimental groups had similar inputs to begin with. If the inputs between 
experimental groups were likely to differ (e.g., with low vs. high capacity participants recalling 
different content information or having different accessibility experiences), differences in 
participants’ judgments could be due to differences in information retrieval and to differences 
in information use. Thus, strong conclusions about factors that moderate reliance on 
accessibility experiences would be methodologically forestalled. By manipulating processing 
capacity after ease-of-retrieval, we avoided this confound and created conditions that allow 
for strong conclusions about the moderating impact of processing capacity on the reliance on 
accessibility experiences. 
Materials and Procedure. After entering the laboratory, participants were led to one of 
six cubicles. Participants were then asked to consent to their participation and were 
subsequently provided with the experimental instructions. 
First, participants were told that they would be working on several tasks, some of 
which required special instructions. To ensure a maximum of similarity between the two 
capacity conditions, the load manipulation and timing restrictions were subsequently 
explained to all participants. That is, all participants learned that there might be tasks during 
which they had to memorize a number while processing time was restricted. Also, all 
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participants were subjected to an example task of this manipulation to ascertain a high level 
of familiarity with the procedure. Finally, participants were told that due to efficiency 
considerations, not all participants would be working on all tasks, hence the described tasks 
were not necessarily part of their specific session. Also, it was stressed that processing time 
was only restricted if explicitly stated. 
Second, in line with what was discussed above, we wanted to ensure a sufficiently 
high level of processing motivation as a necessary precondition for systematic judgment 
formation. We therefore explicitly instructed all participants to work attentively throughout the 
experiment. 
Third, by asking participants to recall two versus five arguments in favor of the 
surgery fee, we manipulated the amount of accessible information and the experienced ease, 
respectively (see Schwarz et al., 1991). Participants stated their experience of ease or 
difficulty in recalling these arguments on two items, both ranging from 1, ‘very easy,’ to 9, 
‘very difficult’: ‘How easy versus difficult did you experience the retrieval of arguments to 
be?’; ‘How easy versus difficult would the retrieval of further arguments be?’ Fourth, 
participants’ processing capacity was manipulated by means of the practiced processing 
restrictions that were administered to one half of the participants (low capacity group), but not 
to the other half (high capacity group). 
Fifth, participants stated on four 9-point Likert-scaled items their attitude toward the 
introduction of the quarterly surgery fee. For example, the first item read: ‘I consider the 
introduction of the surgery fee to be … (very good – very bad).’  For participants in the low 
processing capacity condition, each judgmental item was preceded by a reminder to continue 
remembering the 8-digit number. This was done to keep the load at a constant high level 
throughout the judgmental phase.  
Sixth, participants in the reduced processing capacity condition were asked to write 
down the 8-digit number they had to remember during the judgmental phase. Embedded 
within several unrelated questions to ensure unobtrusiveness, four 9-point Likert-scaled 
items were administered to all participants in order to measure the success of our capacity 
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manipulation. Specifically, two items asked for the impairment of participants’ ability to 
concentrate, and two items asked for the subjectively experienced time pressure. The items 
ranged from ‘does apply’ to ‘does not apply’ and read, for example: ‘I was able to concentrate 
on the judgmental task.’1 
Finally, demographic information including age and gender was assessed. 
Participants were debriefed following APA suggestions, remunerated, and thanked for their 
participation.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. The two items assessing experienced ease served as a check 
for the ease-of-retrieval manipulation. Since the two items intercorrelated to a high degree 
(r = .81), they were combined to form a single measure. This measure was scaled such that 
higher values indicate lower experienced ease. Indicating a successful manipulation, 
participants who recalled two arguments experienced the recall task as being easier than 
participants in the five arguments condition (M = 5.6, SD = 2.19 and M = 7.23, SD = 1.76, 
F(1, 85) = 14.86, p < .01).  
The four items serving as check for the capacity manipulation were coded in the 
same direction, such that higher values indicate less ability to focus on the judgmental task. 
As the four items were strongly interrelated, a single measure was formed 
(Cronbach’s α = .82). This score was subjected to a 2 (few vs. many arguments) x 2 (high vs. 
low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA, yielding, as expected, only a significant main 
effect for processing capacity (F(1, 83) = 13.58, p < .01). The success of the selected 
capacity manipulation is underscored by the finding that participants in the low versus high 
capacity condition reported more concerns about their ability to focus during the judgmental 
task (M = 4.21, SD = 2.00 and M = 2.95, SD = 1.18). Additionally, we analyzed how 
accurately participants were able to recall the number they had to memorize. This analysis 
was restricted to low capacity participants, because high capacity participants did not have to 
a recall a number. Results indicate that recall accuracy was similar in the two versus five 
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arguments condition (42% vs. 32% correct, respectively, 2(1, N = 38) = .45, p > .50), thus 
being a further indication of the success of the selected capacity manipulation.2  
Attitude judgments. The four items assessing participants’ attitude were rescaled, 
such that for all items higher values signal more positive judgments. Items were then 
combined to form a single measure (Cronbach’s α = .93) and were subjected to a 2 (few vs. 
many arguments) x 2 (high vs. low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed the predicted interaction effect of the two independent variables, F(1, 83) = 4.08, 
p < .05, all other ps > .21, see Figure 1. Planned contrast analyses further showed that 
participants for whom processing capacity had been experimentally impaired endorsed more 
positive judgments after recalling few as opposed to many arguments (M = 3.81, SD = 2.15 
and M = 2.81, SD = 1.91, t(83) = 1.47, p < .07, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.49). In line with 
prior research (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), this medium size effect (see Cohen, 1992) 
indicates experience-wise judgments. Conversely, participants for whom processing capacity 
was not experimentally reduced, judged the surgery fee less positively after recalling few as 
compared to many arguments (M = 3.46, SD = 2.16 and M = 4.29, SD = 2.15, t(83) = 1.38, 
p < .09, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.39), thus indicating a content-wise judgment. In sum, 
results of Experiment 1 provide the first empirical evidence for the outlined hypothesis that 
processing capacity moderates reliance on accessibility experiences versus accessible 
content. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to shed light on the processes underlying the reported pattern of 
effects by means of processing latencies. In Experiment 1, we concluded that participants 
low in processing capacity relied on their subjective experiences because they judged the 
surgery fee more positively after recalling few as compared to many arguments (Schwarz et 
al., 1991). Given that cognitive subjective experiences such as the ease-of-retrieval 
phenomenon have long been conceptualized as single meta-cognitive cues (Koriat & Levy-
Sadot, 1999), the underlying judgmental process was assumed to be heuristic in nature. To 
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investigate such a hypothesis, an analysis of processing latencies provides a powerful tool. 
Interestingly, there is little evidence about processing latencies and use of ease-of-retrieval 
experiences (for an exception, see Ruder & Bless, 2003).  
If low capacity participants judge in a heuristic manner as hypothesized, their 
processing latencies should be independent of the number of previously recalled pieces of 
information. This is because the heuristic cue, the experienced ease or difficulty, is a single 
piece of information, no matter what the actual amount of accessible information was. 
Conversely, if high capacity participants rely upon a systematic analysis of the accessible 
content as suggested, their latencies should depend on the amount of retrieved information. 
This is because systematically evaluating and integrating various pieces of information with 
respect to a judgmental question requires more processing time, the more information is 
available. Thus, participants judging on the basis of a few pieces of information should take 
less time than participants judging on the basis of many pieces of information.  
While we argue that high capacity participants systematically evaluate the available 
content information, an alternative underlying mechanism is sometimes suggested to 
account for the attitudinal pattern reported in Experiment 1. Indeed, the very same attitudinal 
pattern could be hypothesized by assuming that high capacity participants relied on some 
sort of numerosity cue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), judging the surgery fee more positively 
(negatively) because there were more (fewer) arguments. If this were the case, however, 
judgmental latencies in the high capacity group should be similar, because the descriptive 
knowledge about the amount of information (few vs. many) is a single cue, regardless of 
whether many or few pieces of information were recalled. Thus, while the content- and the 
numerosity explanation yield a similar attitudinal pattern, they strongly differ with respect to 
the underlying processes as manifested in participants’ processing latencies.  
In sum, the assessment of latencies appears to be a necessary step towards 
understanding the kind of judgmental process low and high capacity participants relied upon. 
Given the scarcity of evidence with respect to processing latencies and reliance on ease-of- 
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retrieval experiences, assessing latencies is important both for the outlined hypotheses, and 
for research on ease-of-retrieval in general.  
Apart from assessing processing latencies, the experimental material was altered in 
two respects. First, the judgmental domain was changed from attitudinal judgments to self-
judgments in order to demonstrate the general nature of the reported effect. Second, all 
participants were put under load, though with differing levels of taxation. By means of this 
change in manipulation, all instructions and the sequence of tasks were rendered similar 
across the two capacity conditions.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty students from the University of Mannheim participated in a study 
on information processing. Fifty-seven percent of participants were male and the average 
age was 22.5 years (SD = 2.8). Participants were paid EUR 2.50 (approximately USD 2.00) 
for their participation.  
Design and manipulations. In Experiment 2, we replicated the design and 
manipulations reported in Experiment 1, except for the following two changes. First, 
participants in Experiment 2 had to recall a small or a large amount of information about their 
own past self-assertiveness. This manipulation closely parallels the original set-up used by 
Schwarz and colleagues (1991). Based on the results of an independent pre-testing at the 
University of Mannheim, we contrasted two instances (the small, easy amount) with eight 
instances (the large, difficult amount). Second, to render instructions and the sequence of 
events exactly similar across the two capacity conditions, all participants had to make their 
judgments while working on a dual-task paradigm, though with varying degrees of taxation. 
In particular, participants in the high capacity group were instructed to remember a 2-digit-
number (compared to no number in Experiment 1), whereas participants in the low capacity 
group had to remember an 8-digit-number (identical to Experiment 1).  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedures closely resembled those in 
Experiment 1, with the following modifications. First, the retrieval task in Experiment 2 asked 
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for instances of self-assertiveness instead of arguments for the surgery fee as in 
Experiment 1. Accordingly, the wording of the ease manipulation check items was changed 
to ask for the experienced ease of recalling instances instead of arguments. Second, the 
manipulation check for processing capacity was changed, now entailing five items. Three of 
these targeted participants’ capability to concentrate and two asked for the subjectively felt 
time pressure. The five items were anchored on ‘does not apply’ versus ‘applies.’  For 
instance, the first item read: ‘My attention was severely impaired because of remembering 
the number.’ Third, the dependent variables in Experiment 2 were changed due to the new 
topic, all being anchored on ‘does not apply’ versus ‘applies.’ The wording of the three items 
was: ‘Overall, I’m a very self-assertive person,’ ‘In unexpected situations I always know what 
to do,’ ‘I believe I can cope well even in surprising situations.’ Fourth, processing latencies 
were recorded.   
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. A single score was formed based on the two items measuring 
accessibility experiences (r = .73). This index was scaled such that higher values indicate 
lower experienced ease. Paralleling results in Experiment 1, recalling two instances was 
experienced as being easier than recalling eight (M = 4.78, SD = 1.94 and M = 6.64, 
SD = 1.45, F(1, 78) = 23.69, p < .01), thus speaking to the success of the selected 
manipulation.  
The five items measuring capacity impairment were recoded, such that for all items 
higher values indicate lower degrees of available capacity. Again, the items were combined 
to form a single index (Cronbach’s α = .88) that was subjected to a 2 (few vs. many 
instances) x 2 (high vs. low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA. This analysis solely 
yielded a significant main effect for processing capacity F(1, 76) = 49.01, p < .01, with people 
in the high as compared to the low capacity condition reporting less impairment (M = 2.42, 
SD = 1.29 and M = 4.89, SD = 1.83). Thus, the capacity manipulation was entirely 
successful in instigating two different levels of (subjectively felt) processing capacity. 
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Importantly, this was the case even though all participants were subjected to a dual-task 
paradigm, which did vary in the degree of taxation, however.  
Again, accuracy of recall was assessed. As all participants had to recall a number in 
Experiment 2, this measure was submitted to a 2 (few vs. many instances) x 2 (high vs. low 
processing capacity) factorial ANOVA, yielding only a main effect for capacity 
(F(1, 76) = 47.64, p < .01). As expected, recall accuracy was higher in the high (97% correct) 
as compared to low capacity condition (40% correct). Given that no other effect reached 
significance (all F < 0.1), the accuracy measure may serve as an additional indicator for the 
success of the selected capacity manipulation.  
Reported self-assertiveness. The three items assessing participants’ own self-
assertiveness were strongly interrelated and were therefore combined to form a single index 
(Cronbach’s α = .74). Higher values on this measure indicate higher degrees of self-
assertiveness. The combined index was submitted to a 2 (few vs. many instances) x 2 (high 
vs. low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA. Paralleling results of Experiment 1, this 
analysis revealed only the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 76) = 8.07, p < .01 (all other 
F < 1), see Figure 2. Planned contrast analyses further showed that low capacity participants 
rated themselves as more self-assertive after recalling few as opposed to many instances 
(M = 5.46, SD = 1.22 and M = 4.82, SD = 1.77, t(76) = 1.36, p < .10, one-tailed, Cohen’s 
d = 0.42), presumably because they based their judgment on the ease or difficulty they 
experienced while retrieving instances from memory. Contrarily, high capacity participants 
judged their own self-assertiveness lower after recalling few as compared to many instances 
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.65 and M = 5.65, SD = 1.24, t(76) = 2.65, p < .02, Cohen’s d = 0.86), 
presumably because they based their judgment on the accessible content. 
Taken together, the observed judgmental pattern reflects that processing capacity 
moderated participants’ reliance on accessible content versus accessibility experiences. 
Experiment 2 therefore replicated the results observed in Experiment 1, however, within in a 
different judgmental domain (self-assertiveness vs. attitudes), thus speaking to the general 
nature of the hypothesized effect. 
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Judgmental latencies. Apart from replicating the results obtained in Experiment 1, the 
main goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate the processes underlying the observed 
judgmental pattern. This was accomplished by analyzing the time participants needed for 
making judgments. In particular, the latencies for the three self-assertiveness judgments 
were averaged (Cronbach’s α = .64) and subjected to a 2 (few vs. many instances) x 2 (high 
vs. low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA, revealing two significant effects. First, a main 
effect for processing capacity reflects that low capacity participants took less time than high 
capacity participants (M = 3.98 s, SD = 0.88 and M = 5.28 s, SD = 1.61, F(1, 76) = 21.84, 
p < .01), thus indirectly supporting the success of the chosen capacity manipulation. This 
finding is in line with the assumption that individuals are more likely to rely on heuristic 
processing when their processing resources are constrained, whereas a more systematic, 
content-based processing is likely given sufficient processing capacity and motivation (see 
Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).3 
Second, and more importantly, we obtained a significant interaction effect 
(F(1, 76) = 5.38, p < .03). As can be seen in Figure 2, for low capacity participants, a pattern 
of similar processing latencies was observed regardless of whether two or eight pieces of 
information had to be recalled (M = 4.05 s, SD = 0.88 and M = 3.91 s, SD = 0.89, t < 1). This 
finding suggests that low capacity participants did not elaborate substantially on the activated 
content. Had they done so, latencies should have been longer the more information was 
activated. Moreover, latencies should have been correlated with the reported judgments, 
which, however, was not the case (r = -.12, p > .45). Rather, the current result corroborates 
the hypothesis that low capacity individuals judged in a heuristic manner, relying on their 
experiences of ease or difficulty as single meta-cognitive cues (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999).  
Note that the reported similarity of processing latencies for low capacity participants 
rules out content-based alternative explanations for the obtained judgmental pattern. For 
example, it has sometimes been suggested that information retrieved later is of less quality 
than information retrieved first. As a consequence, one could argue that average information 
quality is lower in the many as compared to few condition, and hence that the seeming ease-
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of-retrieval pattern is a disguised content-effect. However, given that processing latencies 
were similar for the few- as compared to many-condition and uncorrelated to the reported 
judgments, such a content-based explanation seems highly unlikely. 
In contrast to participants low in capacity, those high in capacity took less time to form 
their judgments after recalling two rather than eight instances of their own self-assertive 
behavior (M = 4.70 s, SD = 0.99 and M = 5.86 s, SD = 1.90, t(76) = 2.93, p < .01). This 
difference is in line with the hypothesis that high capacity participants systematically 
evaluated the content retrieved from memory and therefore needed more time to integrate 
eight as compared to two pieces of information. Supporting this conclusion, processing 
latencies and reported judgments were significantly related in the condition of low processing 
capacity (r = .34, p < .04). 
Again, note that the reported latency difference for high capacity participants renders 
alternative accounts for the obtained judgmental pattern less likely. For example, while a 
numerosity explanation would suggest a judgmental pattern similar to the one hypothesized 
based on a content-wise explanation, the numerosity explanation would imply that individuals 
relied on a simple number cue (here, number of instances recalled), thus taking similar 
amounts of time regardless of the number of pieces recalled. This, however, was not the 
case.  
In sum, the reported processing latencies strongly support the hypothesized 
underlying mechanisms of heuristic processing for low capacity individuals, and systematic 
processing for high capacity individuals. Together with Experiment 1, the results of 
Experiment 2 clearly demonstrate that processing capacity moderates the reliance on 
accessible content versus accessibility experiences, with the latter being most likely in 
situations of low processing capacity.  
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that individuals’ cognitive capacity moderates their reliance on 
subjective experiences in the form of the experienced ease-of-retrieval. We have argued that 
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under high processing capacity, individuals rely on the activated content. Beyond the results 
obtained, this assumption was supported by the associated latencies. With respect to the low 
capacity condition, we have argued that the pattern of more positive judgments after recalling 
few rather than many instances is presumably due to individuals using their experiences of 
ease or difficulty as input in judgment making. This conclusion seems straightforward and is 
in line with prior research that has relied on similar methodological paradigms (e.g., Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973; Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1996). One may argue, however, 
that more evidence is needed to support the notion that the observed effect was indeed due 
to the reliance on the experienced ease-of-retrieval. To address this legitimate objection, we 
followed prior research that has relied on misattribution paradigms to tackle this question 
(see Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991; for a conceptually similar strategy in the 
domain of affective experiences, see Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
The misattribution paradigm is based on the logic that the experienced ease is only 
used for judgment making if its informational value is not called into question (Schwarz et al., 
1991). If one’s experiences are considered undiagnostic for the judgments to be made, these 
experiences should no longer be used as informational source. For instance, Schwarz and 
colleagues (1991, Experiment 3) informed participants that the music played during the 
retrieval of self-assertive behaviors from memory could change the ease of this recall. 
Participants whose experiences were thus rendered undiagnostic ceased to rely on the 
experienced ease or difficulty, with the result that judgments were no longer based on 
accessibility but on content. Therefore, using a misattribution manipulation allowed us to test 
whether or not participants in the experimental settings of Experiment 1 and 2 were relying 
on their accessibility experiences in the first place.  
The misattribution paradigm serves a second purpose with respect to the current 
research: it allows for the investigation of how flexible individuals’ processing strategies are 
under capacity constraints. Such an investigation seems crucial both because heuristics 
generally – but not necessarily – lead to correct responses, and because conditions of low 
processing capacity seem to dominate in everyday life. Consider, for example, driving a car 
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while listening to the radio, or reading the newspaper while your children are transforming 
their playroom into a soccer stadium. All of these situations are characterized by a lack of 
processing capacity. Given that the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that reliance on 
cognitive subjective experiences is most likely in such situations, we were intrigued by the 
question of how rigid a default experience-based processing is. On the one hand, one may 
argue that due to capacity constraints, individuals need to rely on heuristic processing. On 
the other hand, one could propose that capacity constraints only increase the likelihood for, 
but do not restrict individuals to, reliance on retrieval experiences. As long as the imposed 
constraints are not too severe, individuals may still have the flexibility to resort to content-
based judgments.4 Note that this latter possibility, the switching to an alternative strategy, 
would render the adaptive aspects of the heuristic even more powerful. 
In sum, Experiment 3 addressed the consequences of rendering the experienced 
ease undiagnostic for the judgment to be made. Given the results of Experiments 1 and 2, 
we focused on low capacity participants who presumably relied on the experienced ease-of-
retrieval. Keeping processing capacity low across all conditions, we orthogonally manipulated 
the number of items to be recalled and the diagnosticity of the experienced ease-of-retrieval. 
We hypothesized that low capacity participants rely on their retrieval experiences if the 
diagnosticity of these experiences is not called into question – that is, more favorable 
judgments should be obtained following the recall of few rather than many arguments. 
According to the outlined logic, rendering the experienced ease-of-retrieval undiagnostic 
should attenuate or even reverse this effect.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-three male students from the University of Mannheim participated 
in return for EUR 2.50 (approximately USD 2.00). Participants’ average age was 23.17 years 
(SD = 3.26).  
Design and manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (few vs. many 
arguments) x 2 (experiences diagnostic vs. undiagnostic) between participants factorial 
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design. Furthermore, all participants were put under load by means of the 8-digit dual-task 
paradigm introduced in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, the condition of diagnostic experiences 
was identical to the conditions of low processing capacity in the previous two experiments. 
To further enhance the similarity between the studies, we reused the ease-of-retrieval 
manipulation developed for Experiment 1 (two vs. five arguments in favor of the surgery fee). 
Diagnosticity was manipulated by means of a misattribution paradigm. While 
participants recalled arguments from memory, the background color was switched from white 
to yellow. To differentially influence the diagnosticity of accessibility experiences, we 
informed participants that this change in background color did (or did not) influence their 
verbal creativity. Specifically, participants in the condition of undiagnostic experiences were 
informed that the yellow background changed their verbal creativity. Importantly, this 
information needed to be tailored with respect to the actual experiences participants 
supposedly had. That is, participants in the difficult condition (five arguments) needed to be 
informed that the yellow background rendered verbal creativity worse (thus reducing the 
diagnosticity of the experience of difficulty), and participants in the easy condition (two 
arguments) were told that the yellow background promoted verbal creativity (thus reducing 
the diagnosticity of the experience of ease). In the condition of diagnostic experiences, 
participants were informed that the yellow background had no impact on their verbal 
creativity.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure in Experiment 3 closely resembled 
those of Experiment 1, except for the following modification: After the retrieval of arguments 
from memory, all participants were subjected to the dual-task paradigm introduced in the 
previous studies to establish conditions of low processing capacity. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. The two items assessing the experienced ease versus difficulty 
in recalling arguments from memory were averaged to form a single index (r = .72). This 
index was scaled such that higher values indicate lower experienced ease. Paralleling the 
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results of the previous studies, participants recalling two arguments experienced the retrieval 
task as significantly easier (M = 4.82, SD = 2.0) than participants recalling five arguments 
(M = 7.00, SD = 1.60, F(1, 41) = 15.50, p < .01).  
The four items assessing impairment in processing capacity were recoded, such that 
for all items higher values indicate lower degrees of available capacity. Again, the items were 
combined to form a single index (Cronbach’s α = .66) that was subjected to a 2 (few vs. 
many arguments) x 2 (experiences diagnostic vs. undiagnostic) factorial ANOVA. As 
expected, capacity impairment was similar in all four conditions (Fs < 0.5). More importantly, 
the grand mean was M = 4.05 (SD = 1.51), and thus similar to those reported for the low 
capacity condition in Experiment 1. Even though cross-study comparisons are not 
necessarily meaningful, this similarity may indicate that participants’ capacity in Experiment 3 
was comparably low. 
Attitude judgments. The four items assessing participants’ attitude about the surgery 
fee were averaged to form a unitary measure (Cronbach’s α = .95), with higher values 
indicating more positive judgments. This measure was submitted to a 2 (few vs. many 
arguments) x 2 (experiences diagnostic vs. undiagnostic) factorial ANOVA, yielding the 
predicted significant interaction (F(1, 39) = 6.11, p < .02; all other ps > .14), see Figure 3. 
Specifically, participants in the condition of diagnostic experiences evaluated the surgery fee 
more positively after recalling few rather than many arguments (M = 6.11, SD = 2.49 and 
M = 4.79, SD = 1.95, t(39) = 1.45, p < .08, one-tailed, Cohen’s d = 0.59), presumably 
reflecting reliance on the experienced ease or difficulty. This result is in line with the findings 
of Experiments 1 and 2 for the low capacity groups and with a large body of prior research 
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1996; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), suggesting that 
accessibility experiences may be used as valuable pieces of information in judgment making. 
Such a conclusion is further supported by the finding that the ease effect was eliminated if 
experiences were perceived to be undiagnostic for the judgment in question. Indeed, when 
participants assumed that their experiences were due to the change in background color 
(experiences undiagnostic), they evaluated the surgery fee less positively after recalling few 
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rather than many arguments (M = 3.59, SD = 2.17 and M = 5.41, SD = 1.61, t(39) = 2.05, 
p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.95). Presumably, this was because participants relied on the retrieved 
content as the only diagnostic piece of information they had. Given that constraining 
processing capacity only reduces the likelihood of, but does not preclude, systematic content 
processing, the current result is very much in line with general models of attitude formation 
(e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  
Besides examining whether low capacity participants were relying on their retrieval 
experiences, the misattribution paradigm allows for some conclusions about individuals’ 
flexibility. As participants ceased to rely on their experiences once diagnosticity was called 
into question, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that reliance on accessibility experiences 
in situations of low processing capacity is not a rigid but an adaptive default that takes 
situational variation into account – at least as long as the capacity constraints are not too 
severe. Given that daily life is replete with situations of low processing capacity, the findings 
reported in Experiment 3 are of considerable interest. 
Noticeably, the present experiment was not first to investigate the implications of 
perceived undiagnosticity in conditions of low processing capacity. In particular, in the 
process of demonstrating that accessibility experiences are automatically relied upon, Menon 
and Raghubir (2003, Experiment 4) reported that low capacity participants did not cease to 
rely on their accessibility experiences despite these being questioned. Thus, in contrast to 
the present results, low capacity participants in Menon and Raghubir’s experiment appeared 
to have relied on allegedly undiagnostic experiences of ease or difficulty. Yet, as closer 
inspection reveals, this result is only seemingly in contrast to the current one, because the 
reported studies differ in the diagnosticity information offered to participants. In the current 
experiment, a strong diagnosticity cue was offered by telling participants that a salient feature 
(the background color) would influence verbal creativity. In Menon and Raghubir’s 
experiment, a much weaker cue was offered by giving consensus information about how 
easy or difficult recall should be upon results from a nationwide survey. To the extent that the 
expenditure of processing resources depends on the interplay of the two principles least 
Ease-of-retrieval and processing capacity      - 23 - 
effort and sufficiency as suggested within the heuristic systematic model (e.g., Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), low capacity participants should only cease to rely on accessibility 
experiences if there is good reason to doubt their diagnosticity. Arguably, such good reasons 
were present in the current experiment, but not in the one reported by Menon and Raghubir 
(2003), thus explaining the apparent difference in results.  
General discussion 
We started out from the observation that despite the prominence of the ease-of-retrieval 
heuristic, little empirical evidence is available regarding factors that moderate individuals’ 
reliance on their retrieval experiences (for exceptions, Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Tormala et al., 2002; Ruder & Bless, 2003). In particular, we were 
not aware of any evidence on the potential role of processing capacity as a moderator of the 
use of accessibility experiences in judgment formation. Given the central role of processing 
capacity in social cognition research, the present research addressed this gap.  
Three experiments revealed a clear pattern of results and supported the assumption 
that processing capacity moderates individuals’ reliance on accessibility experiences. 
Specifically, participants low in processing capacity evaluated a surgery fee or their own self-
assertiveness more positively after recalling few rather than many pieces of information. 
Presumably, this is because participants relied on the experience of ease or difficulty 
associated with recalling few as compared to many pieces of information (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973; Schwarz et al., 1991; for an overview, see Schwarz, 1998). Such a 
conclusion is in line with the conceptualization of cognitive subjective experiences as 
heuristics (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; for ease-of-retrieval, see Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), 
and with the notion that conditions of reduced processing capacity foster reliance on 
heuristics (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In contrast, participants 
high in processing capacity evaluated the surgery fee or their own self-assertiveness more 
positively after recalling many as opposed to few pieces of information. Presumably, this was 
due to participants evaluating and integrating the accessible content when forming the 
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respective judgments. Again, this result is in line with general models of attitude formation 
which hold that content-based judgments become more likely as processing capacity 
increases. 
Findings of particular interest 
At least six issues provide particular support for the hypotheses we have advanced. First, the 
interaction effect of amount of information and processing capacity was robust across two 
different judgmental domains. Both judgments about a surgery fee and more self-relevant 
judgments about personal self-assertiveness were affected by the experience of ease or 
difficulty in conditions of low processing capacity, which indicates the general nature of the 
reported effect.  
Second, by assessing participants’ mood states as well as recall accuracy, a number 
of alternative explanations such as differential efficaciousness of the capacity manipulation 
were ruled out. 
Third, several results support the conclusion that the judgmental effects observed in 
the low capacity conditions were indeed due to individuals’ reliance on their retrieval 
experiences. For instance, in Experiment 3, when the experimental setting reduced the 
perceived diagnosticity of the experienced ease-of-retrieval, recalling few rather than many 
instances no longer resulted in more positive evaluations. If we apply the logic proposed by 
prior research on misattribution paradigms (Schwarz et al., 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), 
this finding suggests that low processing capacity participants did rely on the ease-of-
retrieval heuristic to begin with. Further support for this conclusion stems from correlational 
analyses which revealed a substantial negative relationship between experienced ease and 
reported judgments in conditions of low, but not high processing capacity (Experiment 1, r = -
.23, p < .17 and r = -.08, p > .60; Experiment 2, r = -.23, p < .15 and r = .33, p < .05). 
Although reflecting a non-significant tendency only, these correlations suggest that 
participants in conditions of low processing capacity relied on the experienced ease to form 
the respective judgments. 
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Fourth, the conclusion about experienced-based (low capacity group) versus content-
based (high capacity group) judgments was corroborated by processing latencies assessed 
during judgment formation. Given that evidence with respect to processing latencies is 
surprisingly scarce in the ease-of-retrieval literature, these findings are particularly 
noteworthy. Specifically, for the low capacity group, a similar pattern of processing latencies 
was observed regardless of the amount of information recalled, suggesting that participants 
in these conditions relied on single cues of information such as the experience of ease or 
difficulty. Importantly, the observed similarity of processing latencies not only supports the 
outlined hypothesis of heuristic processing, but also rules out any content-based alternative 
explanations for the reported attitudinal pattern (e.g. differential quality of retrieved content). 
High capacity participants, in contrast, took more time to form their judgments after recalling 
many as opposed to few pieces of information. This difference is in line with the hypothesis 
that participants in this condition used the content retrieved from memory and therefore took 
more time to evaluate and integrate many rather than few pieces of information. Again, 
alternative explanations for the reported judgmental pattern are ruled out. For example, if 
high capacity participants relied on some sort of numerosity heuristic instead of on the 
content itself, processing latencies should have been similar, which was not the case. 
Fifth, while the present findings provide the first empirical evidence that processing 
capacity moderates the reliance on cognitive subjective experiences in the form of the 
experienced ease-of-retrieval, a parallel finding has been documented in the domain of 
affective subjective experiences. In particular, Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) reported that 
reliance on the mood-as-information-heuristic (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 
1996) is most likely to occur in situations of low processing capacity. In combination with the 
current research, these results suggest that processing capacity moderates individuals’ 
reliance on subjective experiences across several domains of cognitive and affective 
feelings, underscoring the robustness of the hypothesized effect. 
As a final speculation, one may relate the present findings to an intriguing set of 
studies recently reported by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2005). The authors presented 
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evidence suggesting that ease-of-retrieval experiences not only impact explicit, but also 
implicit measures, yet only if these were based on mechanisms of response compatibility 
processes (e.g., Implicit Association Test, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; for a 
structural analysis of implicit measures, see De Houwer, 2003). In contrast, implicit measures 
based on mechanisms of stimulus compatibility (e.g., semantic priming, Neely, 1977) were 
more likely to be influenced by direct knowledge activation in associative memory. If one 
argues that conditions of low processing capacity foster the impact of mechanisms of 
response compatibility (here: response tendencies elicited by cognitive subjective 
experiences), whereas conditions of high processing capacity foster the impact of 
mechanisms of stimulus compatibility (here: spreading activation of activated content 
information), the findings reported by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2005) further support 
the conclusions drawn in the present set of experiments. Noticeably, however, to 
substantiate such a comparison, further research would be needed.  
Theoretical implications 
Going beyond the reported empirical evidence it is instructing to note that the present 
findings mirror the majority of results with respect to the moderating impact of processing 
motivation on the reliance on ease-of-retrieval experiences (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; 
Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Florack & Zoabi, 2003; Haddock, 
2002). Although this correspondence in findings is conceptually sound due to the functional 
similarities of processing motivation and processing capacity (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), one may 
reasonably ask how the present findings relate to other prior research endeavors that 
showed the reverse effect: Reliance on accessibility experiences in conditions of high but not 
low processing motivation (Wänke & Bless, 2000; Tormala et al., 2002). We think that both a 
methodological and conceptual explanation may account for this (seeming) inconsistency. 
From a methodological perspective, many investigations of the moderating impact of 
processing motivation were harboring a methodological confound as processing motivation 
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was usually manipulated or present prior to the manipulation of retrieval ease. As discussed 
in the introduction to Experiment 1, this order of manipulations is problematic given that 
similar inputs between experimental groups are a necessary precondition for strong 
conclusions about the use of experienced ease in the paradigm introduced by Schwarz and 
colleagues (1991). Indeed, when processing motivation is manipulated prior to ease-of-
retrieval, high- versus low-motivated participants are likely to differ in the recalled content 
information and the associated experiences, hence violating the outlined precondition of 
similar inputs. From this perspective, the described inconsistency in findings may have been 
due to the specific order of manipulations usually chosen. The present experiments 
circumvented this problem by manipulating processing capacity only after differences in 
ease-of-retrieval were instigated. 
From a conceptual perspective, it appears possible that the previous inconsistency in 
findings was only a seeming one, as the moderating impact of processing motivation or 
processing capacity might itself be moderated by a third variable. The following is to illustrate 
this argument in the context of the present experiments. Specifically, while we believe to 
have investigated the default, it is possible to conceive of boundary conditions in which 
experienced ease-of-retrieval may influence judgments even in conditions of high processing 
capacity. For example, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) posited that systematic processing 
strategies are complemented by heuristic processing styles if the accessible content is 
ambiguous in nature. Thus, for conditions of ambiguous accessible content, reliance on 
subjective experiences seems possible even if processing capacity is high. Similarly, for 
conditions in which the experienced ease is attributed to factors that are influential only under 
systematic processing, it is possible that experiences matter even in conditions of high 
processing capacity, despite a generally low probability for this to be the case. Hence, in 
selective boundary conditions, reliance on accessibility experiences may be likely even in 
conditions of high processing capacity. Intriguingly, this argument suggests that what 
appeared to be an inconsistency in findings with respect to the moderating impact of 
processing motivation (Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Aarts & 
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Dijksterhuis, 1999; Florack & Zoabi, 2003; Haddock, 2002; vs. Wänke & Bless, 2000; 
Tormala et al., 2002) might have been systematic variation upon different attributional 
mechanisms. This post-hoc hypothesis remains to be tested. 
Conclusion 
Our central assumption holds that low processing capacity increases individuals’ reliance on 
their cognitive subjective experiences. Given that daily life is replete with situations of low 
processing capacity, one may speculate that many or even most every-day decisions and 
judgments are strongly influenced by cognitive subjective experiences – in other words, what 
governs everyday decision making are accessibility experiences rather than the accessible 
content (even if judgments can easily be rationalized afterwards). Taking into account that 
participants in Experiment 3 were still responsive to current situational constraints, an 
experience-wise default is not only probable, fast, and frugal, but also rather adaptive. 
In sum, we propose that subjective experiences in general, and experienced ease-of-
retrieval, in particular, play a highly important role in human judgment and decision-making. 
Given this importance, we are convinced that research needs to address the long-neglected 
question of when individuals do or do not rely on their subjective experiences. By addressing 
the role of processing capacity, a central determinant of human information processing, the 
present research provides some first important answers.  
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Footnotes 
1 Additionally, participants’ mood was assessed by means of three 9-point Likert-scaled 
items, reading, for example, ‘How are you feeling right now? (quite well – quite bad).’  
These items were included to assess whether the selected ease-of-retrieval manipulation 
differentially influenced participants’ mood states. The items were combined to form a 
single index (Cronbach’s α = .92), which was submitted to a 2 (few vs. many arguments) x 
2 (high vs. low processing capacity) factorial ANOVA, yielding no effect of significance (all 
F < 1). Thus, the ease-of-retrieval manipulation did not selectively influence participants’ 
mood, and hence it seems unlikely that the attitudinal judgments were mediated by 
differences in participants’ mood states. Similar results were obtained in Experiments 2 
and 3 and will therefore not be further reported. 
2 Across Experiments 1 to 3, recall accuracy was considerably low (around 40% correct 
responses, compared to 100% in prior research, e.g. Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). Most likely 
these low accuracy rates were due to the experimental set-up: Whereas participants in 
Gilbert and Osborne’s studies had 25 seconds to rehearse the 8-digit number, participants 
in the current set of experiments had only 5 seconds (i.e. 80% less). From this 
perspective, it appears unlikely that the low levels of recall accuracy reported in the 
present experiments are indicative of reduced adherence to the secondary task or 
diminished experienced load. Rather, if anything, participants in the present experiments 
might have experienced higher load, because keep a shallowly rather than well-rehearsed 
number in memory appears to be more taxing.  
Despite this methodological reason, it seemed desirable to investigate whether recall 
accuracy had an impact on the reported judgmental effects. For that reason, recall 
accuracy was added as a dummy-coded independent variable (correct vs. wrong) to the 
reported ANOVAs of participants’ judgments. Noticeably, across Experiments 1 to 3, none 
of the effects associated with recall accuracy was significant (for all main and interaction 
effects, p > .13), while the significance level of the reported interactions between ease-of-
retrieval and capacity (or diagnosticity) remained unchanged. 
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3 Arguably, the main effect of processing capacity on the measured processing latencies is 
due to the capacity manipulation restricting the allotted time in the low but not in the high 
capacity condition. However, given that participants in the high capacity condition still took 
less time than the maximum time allotted in the low capacity condition (7 seconds), the 
likelihood that the reported main effect is an artefact is low.  
4 In this respect, the latency findings obtained in Experiment 2 suggest that the applied 
experimental setting reduced processing capacity, but that the imposed constraints were 
not too severe. Specifically, participants in the low capacity conditions needed on average 
3.98 seconds for their judgments – thus requiring less time than allowed by the 
experimental setting (7 seconds). In combination with the fact that high capacity 
participants required on average 5.28 seconds, these data suggest that given sufficient 
processing motivation, low capacity participants would have sufficient time to switch to 
alternative strategies apart from heuristic processing. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Mean ratings about the surgery fee with standard errors in Experiment 1 as a function 
of amount of information (few vs. many arguments) and processing capacity (high vs. low). 
Summary index ranged from 1 to 9, with higher values indicating a more positive evaluation of 
the surgery fee. 
Figure 2. Mean self-assertiveness ratings (left chart) and mean processing latencies (right 
chart) with standard errors in Experiment 2 as a function of amount of information (few vs. 
many instances) and processing capacity (high vs. low). Mean self-assertiveness ratings 
ranged from 1 to 9, with higher values indicating more positive self-assertiveness judgments. 
Processing latencies are indicated in seconds. 
Figure 3. Mean ratings about the surgery fee with standard errors in Experiment 3 as a function 
of amount of information (few vs. many arguments) and diagnosticity (experiences diagnostic 
vs. undiagnostic). Summary index ranged from 1 to 9, with higher values indicating a more 
positive evaluation of the surgery fee. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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